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MENTAL STRESS CLAIMS IN NORTH DAKOTA:
EVALUATING THE COMPENSABILITY OF MENTAL
STRESS CLAIMS, UNDER NORTH DAKOTA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase in the number of mental stress claims has been
one of the most significant developments in the workers' compen-
sation system over the past two decades.' While the incidence of
traditional physical injury claims has stabilized, the number of
mental stress claims has exploded.2 At any given time, between
fifteen and thirty percent of our nation's workers suffer from
"diminished efficiency as a result of some type of mental or emo-
tional dysfunction."' Recent studies indicate that seven out of
every ten workers suffer stress-related health problems.4 Accord-
ing to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
sixty to eighty percent of all industrial accidents are stress related.'
The annual cost of mental stress to American industry, resulting
from high turnover, low productivity, and increased medical costs,
is in excess of $100 billion.6
Various changes that have taken place in contemporary soci-
ety are closely related to the increased frequency of mental stress
claims.7 "Mental stress experts" have identified numerous reasons
for the dramatic increase in mental stress claims, including the
mechanization and dehumanization of the workplace, increased
1. 1B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.25(a), at 7-957
(1991). The largest increase in mental stress claims has involved claims in which there has
been no physical injury to the worker. Id. § 42.25, at 7-958. The number of mental stress
claims in California has more than tripled since 1980. Id. In California, an estimated 17%
of all "lost time injuries" are caused by mental stress. Id. See also Nancy Blodgett, Legal
Relief from Tension: Work-Induced Stress Spurs Workers' Comp Claims, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1,
1986, at 17. Although mental stress claims only represented 4.7% of the total claims
presented in 1980, by 1983 that percentage had doubled. Id.
2. Blodgett, supra note 1, at 18.
3. McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund, Corp., 675 P.2d 159, 169 (Or. 1983) (citing
When Stress Becomes Distress: Mental Disabilities Under Workers' Compensation in
Massachusetts, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 287, 304 (1980)).
4. Stress Exacts A Toll In Workplace, Study Says, MIAMI HERALD, May 8, 1991, at 5b.
In a survey performed by Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 33% of surveyed
workers indicated that they would "burn out" in the foreseeable future. Id. The survey
further indicated that 34% of the workers had considered quitting their jobs because of
employment stress and another 14 % had actually quit or changed jobs in response to stress.
Id.
5. Albert Millus, Ferreting Out Fraud, BEST'S REV. PROP. CASUALTY INS. EDITION,
Workers' Comp. 88, at 54 (1988). While early stress claims were almost exclusively heart
attack claims, mental stress claims have expanded to include many other "occupational
disease claims." Id. at 60.
6. Blodgett, supra note 1, at 18.
7. Id. at 17.
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productivity requirements, and inadequate and stifling organiza-
tional structures.8 The introduction of computers into the work-
place has further inflated stress levels by increasing the
expectations and scrutiny placed upon each worker's perform-
ance.9 The stalled economy is another factor that has impacted
stress levels, forcing victims of job cuts to seek inferior employ-
ment and placing additional burdens upon those who survived the
cuts. 1
While stress levels in the work environment have risen,
outside "stress buffers" and social support groups have diminished
in importance and effect." Since 1973, the amount of leisure time
enjoyed by the average American has eroded from twenty-six
hours to seventeen hours weekly.12 During that same time period,
the time spent on work-related activities has increased from forty-
one to forty-seven hours.' 3
Greater public awareness and acceptance of mental disorders
has also contributed to the expansion of mental stress claims by
reducing the stigma attached to mental injuries. 14 The number of
mental stress claims has been further increased by the public's
8. Id. According to Dr. Paul Rosch, president of the American Institute of Stress, major
sources of stress at work include:
Insufficient time to get work done to one's satisfaction.
Lack of a clear job description or chain of command.
Absence of recognition or reward for good job performance.
High level of responsibility with little decision making authority.
Inability or lack of opportunity to voice complaints during daily activities.
Prejudice and bigotry due to sex, race or religion.
Inability to work with superiors or subordinates because of basic personality
differences, goals and values.
Unpleasant or dangerous workplace conditions.
An organizational climate which stifles expression of emotions or consistently
suppresses the ego.
Constant and uncontrollable change and variability in the job or workplace.
Frequent travel over time zones, or shift work that causes a disruption of normal
biological rhythms and family life.
Job insecurity.
Id.
9. Katherine Griffin, Karoshi in America, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 30, 1991, at
liz. While computers have eliminated many menial tasks, they have also increased
expectations that the employee's work will be completed faster. Id.
10. Id. Six million "middle managers" and "well-paid blue-collar workers" lost their
jobs in the 1980s. Id. In addition, over half of the jobs created in the last decade pay less
than $12,000 annually, "the poverty level for a family of four." Id.
11. Blodgett, supra note 1, at 17. Dr. Paul Rosch notes that unlike previous eras, we no
longer have "strong social support groups and family ties are much less distinct." Id.
12. Griffin, supra note 9. Persons ranging in age from 30 to 49 have been hardest hit
by the time squeeze. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. See also 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.24(a). The majority of mental stress
claims are filed by workers under the age of 50. Id. § 42.24, at 7-958. Women file more
stress claims than men and 66% of the mental stress claims are filed by white-collar
workers. Id.
NOTE
reliance on workers' compensation as a replacement for disappear-
ing employee health care programs. 15
As a result of the expansion and recognition of mental stress,
different types of mental stress claims have emerged. 16  Courts
and commentators have divided mental stress claims into three
categories: (1) physical injury causing mental stress injury-physi-
cal-mental; (2) mental stress causing physical injury-mental-phys-
ical; and (3) mental stress causing mental injury-mental-mental. 17
This Note will define and differentiate the three types of
mental stress claims and evaluate the compensability of each cate-
gory of mental stress claim in North Dakota. In Part II, the Note
will review the background and statutory coverage of workers'
compensation in North Dakota. In Part III, this Note will examine
the development of physical-mental claims. Part IV will examine
the expansion of mental-physical claims in North Dakota and the
legislative limitations placed upon those claims. The development
of the mental-mental claims will be reviewed in Part V. Next,
mental-mental claims will be evaluated subject to the same restric-
tions that are imposed on mental-physical claims in North Dakota.
Finally, this Note will consider whether compensating workers for
mental stress injuries is consistent with public policy and purposes
of workers' compensation.
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN NORTH DAKOTA
A. BACKGROUND
Workers' Compensation is a unique combination of social
insurance and tort law.' 8 The result is a social mechanism that
15. Risk Management Executives' Top Concerns Are Damage Caps & Health Costs,
Survey Finds, BNA, Mar. 30, 1992, at A-30.
16. ALBERT J. MILLUS & WILLARD J. GENTILE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND
INSURANCE, at 97-99 (2d 1980).
17. See 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.20; MILLUS & GENTILE, supra note 16, at 97-99
(defining physical-mental cases as "psychosomatic" and mental-mental cases as
"psychopsychic"); Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental
Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 287(1983); Thomas S. Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and
Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 896-97 (1987); See also Pathfinder
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 343 N.E.2d 913, 917-18 (Ill. 1976); Townsend v. Marine Bureau
of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Me. 1979); Deziel v. Difco Lab., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 1,
9 (Mich. 1978).
18. 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.20, at 2 (1990).
Professor Larson observes:
Workmen's compensation is fundamentally different from strict tort liability in
its basic test of liability-work connection rather than fault; in its underlying
philosophy-social protection rather than righting a wrong; in the nature of the
injuries compensated; in the elements of damage; in the defenses available; in
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provides benefits to the victims of work-related injuries."' Prior to
the enactment of workers' compensation statutes, an injured
worker's sole recourse was to pursue largely ineffectual tort reme-
dies.20 The system is funded by employer-paid insurance premi-
ums, the cost of which is passed to the consumer as increased
product cost.2 1 Thus, under workers' compensation the public as a
whole, rather than the individual worker, is burdened with the
cost of work-related injuries.22
Workers' compensation acts share at least eight common fac-
tors: (1) employees who suffer injuries arising out of and in the
course of employment are entitled to guaranteed benefits; (2)
recovery is granted regardless of the employee's fault or the
employer's innocence; (3) coverage is extended solely to employ-
ees to the exclusion of independent contractors; (4) benefits avail-
able include compensation for wage loss and medical expenses to
the injured employee and death benefits to dependents; (5)
employees relinquish their common law right to sue their employ-
ers in exchange for modest but certain compensation for their
injuries; (6) the right to proceed against third parties is retained
by the employee; (7) administrative agencies or commissions
oversee the operation of the workers' compensation system; and
(8) the system is funded by employer-paid insurance premiums.23
The first workers' compensation act was passed in North
Dakota in 191924 as a part of a nationwide movement to protect
employees from increased industrial accidents and decreased
availability of common law tort remedies.2- The remedial purpose
the amount of compensation; in the ownership of the award; and in the
significance of insurance.
19. Id. § 2.00 at 5.
1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 1.00, at 1. See also MILLUS & GENTILE, supra note 16, at
46. Workers' compensation requires that employers carry insurance or qualify as self-
insurers, guaranteeing the availability of benefits to injured workers. Id.
20. See 1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 4.00-4.30, at 23-28. The availability of common law
tort remedies to the employee was extremely limited. Id. Employers could avoid liability
through the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant
rule. Id. As a result, the cost of the vast majority of workplace injuries was placed upon the
employee. Id.
21. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-04 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (providing employers'
obligation to purchase insurance and participate in the workers' compensation system).
22. 1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 1.10, at 2.
23. Id. § 1.10, at 1-2. See also MILLUS & GENTILE, supra note 16, at 45-51 (providing a
basic general background to workers' compensation).
24. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act, 1919 N.D. Laws ch. 162, § 258
(codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01 to 65-14-05 (1985 & Supp. 1991)).
25. 1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 5.20, at 37. At the time of the passage of the first
workers' compensation act in North Dakota, all but eight states had adopted similar acts.
Id. at § 5.30. See also MILLUS & GENTILE, supra note 16, at 30. "In the years immediately
following 1910, almost every jurisdiction ... enacted a workmen's compensation statute."
Id.
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of workers' compensation is to protect injured workers and ensure
the "prosperity of the state."'2 6 As a result, workers' compensation
statutes are "liberally construed ' 27 and broadly applied.28 Today,
workers' compensation in North Dakota protects employees from
the financial strain of industrial accidents by providing guaran-
teed, but modest, relief for employment-related injuries.29
Employees waive their common law tort rights in exchange for
legislative remedies affording compensation regardless of fault.30
In return, employers, through the vehicle of insurance premiums,
are insulated against potential catastrophic injury loss and the
uncertainty of jury verdicts.3 '
B. STATUTORY COVERAGE IN NORTH DAKOTA
Workers' compensation extends coverage to employees who
suffer "compensable injuries. "32 Injuries caused "by accident aris-
ing out of and in the course of employment" are compensable. 3
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1991). Section 65-01-01 provides in
part: "[T]he prosperity of the state depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its
wage workers, and, hence, for workers injured.., sure and certain relief is hereby provided
regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy .... " Id.
27. See Lawson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 344,
347 (N.D. 1987) (holding that workers' compensation statutes "should be liberally construed
in favor of the worker"); Holmgren v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 455
N.W.2d 200, 202 (N.D. 1990) (holding that the workers' compensation statute should be
applied liberally); Balliet v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 297 N.W.2d
791, 794 (N.D. 1980) (recognizing that the statute should be construed to avoid forfeiture
and afford relief).
28. See Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202; Balliet, 297 N.W.2d at 794. See also 1 LARSON,
supra note. 18, § 5.30, at 39. The growth of workers' compensation has been characterized
by the expansion of the scope of coverage. Id.
29. 1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 1.10, at 2 (noting that workers' compensation statutes
uniformly provide limited but sure relief to injured workers).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1991). See also Barsness v. General
Diesel & Equip. Co., 422 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1988) (holding that an employee's
exclusive remedy is limited to compensation provided by workers' compensation statute).
31. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (providing that workers'
compensation is an exclusive remedy).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
33. Id. Section 65-01-02 provides in part:
8. "Compensable injury" means an injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment.
a. The term "compensable injury", in addition to an injury by accident,
includes:
(1) Any disease which can be fairly traceable to the employment.
Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public outside of the
employment is exposed shall not be compensable except where the
disease follows as an incident to, and in its inception is caused by a
hazard to which an employee is subjected in the course of his
employment. The disease must be incidental to the character of the
business and not independent of the relation of employer and
employee. The disease includes impairment and effects from
radiation fairly traceable to the employment. It need not have been
foreseen or expected, but after it is contracted, it must appear to have
had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have
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In addition, diseases that can be "fairly traced" to employment are
compensable.34 Diseases to which the general public is exposed,
however, are not compensable unless the disease is incident to
employment and caused by a hazard in the employee's work
environment.35
Mental and physical injuries caused by work-related mental
stress are also compensable.36 The compensability of injuries
resulting from mental causes is, however, expressly limited.3' The
claimant must prove the existence of "unusual stress" 38 and causa-
tion must be established "with reasonable medical certainty."39
III. PHYSICAL-MENTAL CLAIMS
A. HISTORY
Mental injuries that follow as a natural and direct result of a
previous compensable injury have long been established as com-
pensable.40 As early as 1925, the compensability of mental injuries
caused by physical impact or injury was recognized by a court.41
In recognizing the compensability of physical-mental injuries,
courts have relied upon the existence of an objective cause (the
employment-related event causing the initial compensable physi-
cal injury) to assist in ensuring the validity of the mental injury and
its causal relationship to the employment.42 When the chain of
flowed from that source as a rational consequence. However,
preventative treatment for communicable diseases is not
compensable under this title.
Id.
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX1) (Supp. 1991). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-
01-02(17) (Supp. 1991) (defining "[f]airly traceable"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XbX6)
(Supp. 1991) (limiting the compensability of preexisting conditions).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaXl) (Supp. 1991).
36. Id. § 65-01-02(8XaX3). Compensable injuries include "[i]njuries due to heart attack,
stroke, and mental or physical injury precipitated by mental stimulus, which must be
causally related to the employee's employment, with reasonable medical certainty, and
which must have been precipitated by unusual stress." Id. "Mental stimulus" is the North
Dakota statutory term for mental stress. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id. Section 65-01-02(8XaX3) of the North Dakota Century Code requires that
injuries from mental stress "be precipitated by unusual stress." Id.
39. Id. Section 65-01-02(8XaX3) of the North Dakota Century Code also requires that
mental stress injuries be "causally related to the employee's employment, with reasonable
medical certainty." Id.
40. See 58 AM. Jun. Workmen's Compensation § 250 (1948 & Supp. 1975) (recognizing
the compensability of mental disorders following a physical injury).
41. See Rialto Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 240 P. 96, 99 (Okla. 1925)
(finding that claimant's nervous breakdown and neurasthenic condition was compensable).
42. See generally 1B LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 42.21-23. Professor Larson notes that
both the physical-mental and mental-physical claims are uniformly accepted. Id. at § 42.23,
at 7-876. The mental-mental claim, however, contains no physical component and remains
much more controversial. Id. See also MILLUS & GENTILE, supra note 16, at 98 (noting that
physical-mental injuries are sometimes referred to as "psychosomatic cases").
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causation between the physical and mental injury is indefinite or
broken, courts have denied compensation.43 For example, if a
claimant's mental disability is not the direct result of a prior com-
pensable injury, but instead is attributable to nonemployment
causes, compensation has not been granted.44 Courts have, how-
ever, awarded compensation to claimants suffering from preexist-
ing mental conditions, when those conditions have been
aggravated by an employment-related physical injury.45 Because
of the inherent safeguards46 that exist in physical-mental claims,
courts have uniformly held that physical-mental injuries are
compensable.47
43. See 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(f), at 7-866; Greater Miami Academy v.
Blum, 466 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that claimant's depression
occurring nine months after a compensable back injury was not compensable); Nigherbon
v. Ralph E. Feller Trucking, Inc., 706 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Idaho 1985) (holding that the
claimant's depression was not causally linked to prior compensable injury he suffered while
driving a truck); Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead, 364 P.2d 696, 699 (Okla. 1961)
(denying compensation based upon the fact that the claimant's fatal heart attack was not
sufficiently linked to prior compensable injury and resulting depression).
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
45. See LB LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(b), at 7-856-60 (citing an extensive list of cases
in which courts allowed compensation for aggravation of preexisting mental injury by a
physical injury); Ricky Coal Co. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Ky. 1968) (holding that the
claimant's dormant mental disorder activated by physical injury was compensable); Knief v.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 291 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (finding that
the claimant's predisposition to mental disability did not preclude an award for total
disability); Kobayashi v. Siuslaw Care Ctr., 709 P.2d 249, 251-52 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that a claimant with a history of psychological problems was properly compensated for
"functional overlay" resulting from physical injury).
46. Physical-mental claims contain several inherent guarantees of legitimacy. The first
guarantee is that the claimant has actually suffered a work-related injury. For example,
where a claimant has received a blow to the head and subsequently develops a neurosis, a
court awarding compensation can be assured that at a minimum, the physical component of
the claimant's physical-mental claim was work related. Second, the court can assess
whether the prior compensable physical injury is a reasonable cause of the claimant's
present mental disorder and deny compensation where a causal relationship is lacking. See
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47. See Fruehauf Corp. v. Prater, 360 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (holding
that "depressive neurosis" caused by an employee's bum-related disability was
compensable), writ denied, 360 So. 2d 1003; City of Tampa v. Tingler, 397 So. 2d 315, 317
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "psychiatric disability" arising out of employee's
work-related physical struggle with criminals was compensable); Walton County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Williams, 320 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that depression
caused by work-related heat stroke was compensable); Bruce v. Clear Springs Trout Farm,
707 P.2d 422, 423 (Idaho 1985) (holding that "psychogenic pain syndrome caused by effects
of claimant's injury" was compensable); Ducharme v. Garland Belongia, 544 So. 2d 590, 592
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "post traumatic stress disorder" from employee's minor
automobile accident was compensable); Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 91 N.W.2d 516,
518-19 (Mich. 1958) (holding that "conversion hysteria" caused by employee being struck
by a "weight" was compensable); Hansel v. Chrysler Corp., 227 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975) (finding that "nervous tremors" and "anxiety" caused by swelling in employee's
injured hand were compensable); Mitchell v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 290 N.W.2d 753, 754
(Minn. 1980) (holding that an employee's psychological injuries resulting from being struck
by a customer were compensable); Gunnerson v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 535
S.W.2d 585, 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that an injury to employee's "psyche"
resulting from fall off a roof was compensable); Johnston v. State, 364 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Neb.
1985) (finding that psychological injury resulting from the unintentional ingestion of "coffee
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Increased recognition and understanding of mental injuries
has resulted in compensation awards for nearly every conceivable
type of physically-induced mental disorder.4 Conditions found
urn cleaner" was compensable); Webb v. Hamilton, 436 P.2d 507, 510 (N.M. 1968) (holding
that "depressive reaction neurosis" caused by an employee's partial vision loss was
compensable); Wallace v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 93 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (App. Div. 1949) (holding
that "functional neurosis" caused by a hammer blow to the employee's head was
compensable); Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 97 A.2d 579, 580 (R.I. 1953) (holding that "fear
complex" caused by employee's physical injury was compensable); Kennedy v.
Williamsburg County, 131 S.E.2d 512, 513 (S.C. 1963) (holding that evidence supported a
finding that "paranoid schizophrenia" caused by a physical attack on employee was
compensable); Merril v. Town of Ludlow, 514 A.2d 1050, 1051 (Vt. 1986) (holding that
"unmasked hysteria" caused by employee's back injury was compensable); Seneca Falls
Greenhouse & Nursery v. Layton, 389 S.E.2d 184, 185 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
"panic attack" caused by employee's exposure to pesticides was compensable). See also IB
LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(a), at 7-832. Professor Larson states that "when there has
been a physical accident or trauma, and claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by
traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria or hysterical paralysis it is now uniformly held that
full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable." Id.
48. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(a), at 7-832. "There is almost no limit to the
variety of disabling 'psychic' conditions that have already been recognized as legitimately
compensable-conditions which not many years ago would have received little
understanding or recognition on the part of the courts." Id. at 7-855. For a complete
diagnostic description of all the various types of mental disorders, see AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1987).
The major classes of emotional disorders can essentially be divided into two main
categories, psychosis and neurosis. 2 J.E. SCHMIDT, THE A'ITORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER, N-45, P-249 (1982).
[Neurosis] is regarded as a functional disease, i.e., one not caused by a lesion
(structural change) of the nervous system. There is no appreciable
disorganization of the personality and no loss of understanding of the external
reality, although there is some impairment of judgment and rational thinking. It
is believed that neuroses are caused by an unsuccessful attempt to resolve
subconscious emotional conflicts. The neuroses are classified and named on the
basis of the predominant symptom, such as anxiety, which is a common
accompaniment of the neurotic state. The more common neuroses are: anxiety
neurosis, depressive neurosis, obsessive neurosis, compulsive neurosis, [and]
phobic (fear) neurosis .. .[a]lso called psychoneurosis.
id. at N-45.
[Psychosis is a] mental disorder in which the personality is seriously affected,
being much more disorganized than in the case of a neurosis. Insight is usually
lost; this is to say that the patient does not realize that his symptoms are abnor-
mal and he fails to recognize reality. He loses the capacity to communicate and
to relate to others. The condition also deprives him of the ability to cope with
the problems of everyday life. A psychosis is more incapacitating than a neurosis
and is less likely to terminate in a cure.
Id. at P-249. For complete "case examples" of the various mental disorders most fre-
quently involved in workers' compensation litigation, see Nelson C. Policastro, Neurological
and Psychiatric Injuries, 21 TRAUMA 3:47, 3:90 (1979). Trauma induced neurosis resulting
from an "[i]ndustrial [a]ccident" is "[c]haracterized by marked anxiety and fear" and is
"[a]ssociated with pyschosomatic symptoms." Id. at 3:89. This type of neurosis can be
divided into three classes: (1) "[tlraumatic anxiety neurosis;" (2) "[h]ysterical conversion
neurosis;" and (3) "[d]epressive neurosis." Id. Traumatic anxiety neurosis is characterized
by "[a]nxiety," "[e]motional irritability," "[n]ervousness," and "[flear." Id.
In contrast, "hysterical conversion neurosis" can be diagnosed through objectively
determined manifestations affecting a person's "special senses and voluntary nervous sys-
tem," including "[d]eafness," "[b]lindness," "[1]oss of smell," and "[p]aralysis." Id. Depres-
sive neurosis is characterized "by an excessive reaction of depression" caused by a "physical
or psychic trauma." Id. at 3:92. For example, a depressive neurosis could result from an
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compensable by the courts include "depressive neurosis,"49 "psy-
chogenic pain syndrome,"50 "post traumatic stress disorder," 5'
"conversion hysteria, 51 2 and "psychological functional overlay."15 3
B. DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH DAKOTA
Physical-mental injuries contributing to disability have been
recognized as compensable in North Dakota since 1964. 54 The
compensability of physical-mental claims is, however, contingent
on the claimant's ability to prove the existence of a disabling injury
causally related to a prior compensable injury. In Lyson v. North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,5 1 the claimant sought
to recover benefits after suffering a major injury to his spine.5 7
The injury required two major back operations, rendering the
employment-related traumatic event involving physical injury, harassment or confronta-
tions in the workplace. Id.
In the second major category of emotional disorder, psychosis, the disordek most fre-
quently encountered in workers' compensation cases is "paranoid psychosis." Id. at 3:94.
This type of psychosis "is characterized by hypersensitivity to the opinions of others with
whom they work, blaming others for their own errors and inadequacies and an inability to
adjust to others." Id.
One of the major problems with mental-mental claims is that the severity of a claim-
ant's emotional disorder is often unrelated to the severity of the disability caused by that
disorder. Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress, 30
TRAUMA 2:13, 2:16 (1988). For example, "[p]ersons with very serious psychiatric diagnoses
[psychosis] can have little, if any impairment, and people with relatively mild psychiatric
diagnoses (formerly called neurosis) can be severely incapacitated." Id.
49. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(a), at 7-855. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text (noting that a depressive neurosis is characterized by an excessive
depression reaction).
50. 1B LARSON, supra note 1 § 42.22(a), at 7-855. See also 2 J.E. SCHMIDT, THE
ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER, p-2 4 6 (1982) (noting that
psychogenic injuries are injuries originating in the mind through a mental process).
51. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(a), at 7-855. See also SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at
p-196 (noting that post traumatic stress occurs "after, and as a result of, injury to a part of
the body").
52. lB LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(a), at 7-855. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text (noting that hysterical conversion neurosis is characterized by affects on
the claimant's "special senses and voluntary nervous system").
53. Id. See infra note 59 and accompanying text ("functional overlay" is a term
utilized by psychiatrists to account for a claimant's condition in the absence of identifiable
physical cause).
54. See Lyson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351
(N.D. 1964). Following Lyson, the North Dakota Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
compensability of physical-mental injuries. See Aus v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 280 N.W.2d 911, 914 (N.D. 1979) (entitling claimant to a formal
evidentiary hearing on alleged claim of neurosis resulting from employee's fall); Darnell v.
Workers' Compensation Bureau, 450 N.W.2d 721, 725 (N.D. 1990) (reaffirming the
compensability of physical-mental injuries in North Dakota).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8) (Supp. 1991). Physical-mental claims do not
require "unusual stress" or "reasonable medical certainty". Id. Section 65-01-02(8XaX3) is
not applicable when mental injuries are caused by physical stimuli resulting in a prior
compensable injury. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3) (Supp. 1991). See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
56. 129 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 1964).
57. Lyson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351, 355
(N.D. 1964).
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claimant unemployable in his former occupation as a laborer."8 In
addition to the claimant's physical injuries, experts testified that
the claimant's operations had caused the claimant to suffer from
"'neurosis, hysteria and functional overlay,"'59 contributing signifi-
cantly to the claimant's total disability.60 Examining the relation-
ship between the claimant's mental disorder and his employment-
caused physical injury, the court observed that the causal chain
between the claimant's physical injury and mental disorder was
not broken.61 The court further stated that "[i]n the whole record
there is no proof that claimant is malingering or that he does not
suffer the pain of which he complains" and "in the absence of any
other explanation in the record, we must find that the neurosis and
resulting disability was caused by claimant's injury and subsequent
treatment thereof."62
Affirming the district court's award of benefits for permanent
total disability,6 3 the North Dakota Supreme Court observed that
"[n]eurosis, emotional disturbances, and mental illness can be as
disabling as the most serious of physical injuries, even though they
cannot be established by objective diagnostic procedures. '64 The
court added that "[w]e have no doubt but that disabilities which
are the result of neurosis caused by injuries are compensable. 65
In considering the validity of a physical-mental claim, the
court in Lyson made two inquiries.66 The court first examined the
chain of causation between the claimant's prior physical injury and
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy of Litigation Involving Mental Distress,
30 TRAUMA 2:13, 2:29 (1988). "Functional overlay" is a term used by psychiatrists to
account for the existence of a patient's symptoms for which there appears to be no physical
cause. Id. This method of diagnosis, termed "diagnosis by exclusion," has been attacked by
critics who assert that the absence of "physical findings is not in itself sufficient to justify a
psychiatric diagnosis." Id. (quoting Physicians' Guide for Disability Evaluation
Examinations, Veterans Administration, March, 1985).
60. Lyson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351, 355
(N.D. 1964).
61. Id. The court noted that "[s]uccessive operative traumata" resulting from the
claimant's spinal operations was the only apparent explanation for the claimant's condition.
Id. The court held that "in the absence of any other explanation .. we must find that the
neurosis and the resulting disability were caused by the claimant's injury and subsequent
treatment thereof." Id. The court also observed that "the causal chain between the injury
and neurosis" appeared unbroken. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 356.
64. Id. at 354. The Lyson court noted that the claimant had a very limited education
and was not qualified for employment other than manual labor. Id. at 355. The claimant
suffered from genuine pain and was not a "malingerer." Id. The court also observed that
the causal chain between the claimant's injury and mental disorder was not broken. Id.
65. Lyson, 129 N.W.2d at 354 (citing numerous authorities).
66. Id.
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his present mental disability.67 Next, the court conducted a com-
plete review of the claimant's work and medical history to deter-
mine the legitimacy and extent of the claimant's disability.'
Presently, courts evaluating a claimant's disability consider
the following statutory factors including the claimant's age, educa-
tion, "vocational rehabilitation potential," and the nature and
degree of the injury involved.69 The court's acceptance of the
claimant's mental disability as compensable ultimately rests on the
testimony of medical experts and their ability to convey a reason-
able cause and effect relationship between the claimant's previous
physical injury and his or her present mental condition.7 °
In a more recent case, Kuklok v. Workers' Compensation
Bureau,7 1 the claimant sought recovery for a mental disorder that
was the alleged result of physical injuries suffered by the claimant
while working on a pipeline. 72 Evidence was introduced that the
claimant had been the victim of two work-related accidents result-
ing in a "broken collar bone," "contusions of the left kidney," and
67. Id. at 355.
68. Id.
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(12) (1985 & Supp. 1991). Under section 65-01-02, six
factors are considered when determining disability: "(1) Nature of the injury; (2) Degree of
physical impairment; (3) Age; (4) Education; (5) Work history; and (6) Vocational
rehabilitation potential." See also Lyson, 129 N.W.2d at 355. The court based much of its
decision to award compensation on the fact that the claimant, only educated through the
eighth grade, could no longer perform manual labor, the only job for which he was
qualified. Id. The court also noted that the claimant had made numerous unsuccessful
attempts to resume working as a laborer and there was no proof that the claimant was
"malingering." Id. The Lyson court stated:
The words "total disability" as used in the workmen's compensation acts should
be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense. In order to determine total
disability under the statutes both the type of work being done at the time of the
accident and the nature and extent of the injury must be considered; and regard
must be had to age, experience, training, and capabilities of the employee.
Generally, an employee is totally incapacitated and entitled to the
compensation provided therefor where by reason of the injury he is so
disqualified from performing the usual tasks of a workman that he is unable to
procure and retain employment.
Id. (quoting 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 299 (1958)).
70. See 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(f), at 7-866 (noting that courts deny
compensation where a cause and effect relationship does not exist between the claimant's
prior compensable physical injury and resulting mental disorder). See also Lyson, 129
N.W.2d at 355. "While the physicians have not been able to account for the [claimant's]
pain upon the basis of concrete physical defects, they have accounted for it on the basis of
neurosis, hysteria and functional overlay." Id. See also Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy Of
Litigation Involving Mental Distress, 30 TRAUMA 2:13, 2:41 (1988). While providing an
evaluation of various defense and plaintiff strategies employable in mental disability
litigation, Dr. Marcus notes that the threshold step in establishing a mental disability claim
is the conversion of a claimant's behavior into a recognized mental disorder. Id. at 2:13-14.
"This process can only be properly and legally performed by official state licensed
conversion agents,' namely psychiatrists and psychologists." Id. at 2:14.
71. 492 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1992).
72. Kuklok v. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 492 N.W.2d 572, 573 (N.D. 1992).
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a "disabling back injury." 3 Two medical experts testified that the
claimant was suffering from a mental disorder as a result of his
work-related accidents. 4 Additional medical experts confirmed
that the claimant was suffering from a mental disorder, but con-
cluded that the claimant's mental disorder was not causally linked
to his work-related accidents. 5
The Workers Compensation Bureau awarded benefits to the
claimant for his physical injuries, but denied the claimant compen-
sation for his mental disorder.7 6 The Bureau rejected medical evi-
dence supporting a causal link between the claimant's
employment and his mental disorder on the grounds that the evi-
dence failed to adequately account for the claimant's preexisting
"psychological problems. ''1 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the Bureau's deci-
sion, holding that the claimant did not have a compensable psy-
chological disorder.78 Applying the limited standard of review
required on appeals from Bureau decisions, 9 the court concluded
73. Id. While performing work-related duties, the claimant was involved in a one
vehichle accident and then one week later was struck by a portion of pipe. Id.
74. Id. at 574. One medical expert, Dr. Mayer, concluded that the claimant was
suffering from an "'adjustment disorder"' and "'agitated depression"' which was
precipitated by the claimant's employment accidents. Id. Dr. Mayer, however, also stated
that the claimant was to some degree predisposed to the mental disorder that he suffered.
Id. Another medical expert, Dr. Foster, concluded that the claimant was suffering from
" 'post-trauamtic stress disorder' " and that the claimant's "psychiatric problems" were
causally related to his employment accidents. Id.
75. Id. A third medical expert, Dr. Berg, concluded that the claimant suffered from
"'significant emotional problems'" predating his accidents and that the claimant's mental
disorder was not causally related to the his accidents. Id. The final medical expert, Dr.
McNairy, diagnosed the claimant "as having a paranoid personality disorder, and he
concluded that neither work accident . . . was a substantial cause of (the claimant's)
psychiatric problems." Id.
76. Id. at 573.
77. Kuklok, 492 N.W.2d at 575. The Bureau explained its decision as follows:
In forming his opinions, Dr. Foster relied primarily upon claimant's own
history. Dr. Foster did not administer any psychological tests, and he did not
review the Veteran's Administration medical records or a number of other
medical records and reports relating to treatment and evaluations of the
claimant that predate his work injuries .... The greater weight of the evidence
does not indicate that claimant's psychiatric disorders are causally related to his
work injuries, or that the work injuries substantially contributed to his
psychiatric disorders or symptoms of those disorders. The Bureau bases this
finding primarily on the opinions of Drs. McNairy and Berg .... The Bureau
finds that claimant had a personality disorder that pre-existed his work injuries.
Claimant's current symptoms are related to this personality disorder, and there
is insufficient substantiation that his symptoms are causally related to the work
injuries, or that the work injuries substantially contributed to his current
symptoms.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 573. The court reiterated that Bureau decisions are upheld unless the
Bureau's "findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (citing N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-32-19(5) (1991)). The court added that "[iun making that determination,
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that the Bureau's decision was supported by a preponderance of
the evidence.8 0 Further, the court noted that the Bureau's deci-
sion was supported by credible medical evidence"' and that a rea-
sonable person could conclude that the claimant's psychiatric
problems were not casually related to his industrial accidents.8 2
The court added that the conflict in medical testimony presented
"a classic illustration of the limits of psychiatry and psychology in
analyzing human behavior based upon the present state of scien-
tific knowledge."8
s3
While physical-mental injuries remain compensable in North
Dakota, difficulties in establishing causation and the limited stan-
dard of review applied to Bureau decisions limit the potential suc-
cess of physical-mental claims brought before the courts.8 4 The
court's acceptance of the claimant's mental disorder as compensa-
ble ultimately rests on the testimony of medical experts and their
ability to convey a reasonable cause and effect relationship
between the claimant's previous physical injury and present
mental condition.85
we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the
Bureau." Id. (citing Jones v. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 461 N.W.2d 273 (N.D. 1990)).
When reviewing Bureau decisions the court only considers "whether the Bureau could
have reasonably reached its factual determinations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Kuklok, 492 N.W.2d at 573 (citing Moses v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau,
429 N.W.2d 436 (N.D. 1988). See also infra note 121 and accompanying text (outlining the
limited standard of review applied to Bureau decisions).
80. Id. at 575.
81. Id. Addressing the conflict in medical testimony, the court stated: "We will not
substitute our judgment for that of the Bureau in weighing and judging the credibility of
medical evidence." Id. (citing Kroeplin v. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 434 N.W.2d 351
(N.D. 1989).
82. Kuklok, 492 N.W.2d at 575. The court stated: "Although the Bureau may weigh
and resolve conflicting medical opinions, the Bureau must adequately explain its reason for
disregarding evidence favorable to the claimant." Id. (citing DeChandt v. North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau, 452 N.W.2d 82 (N.D. 1990)). The court added: "The
Bureau must explain why it is relying upon medical evidence supporting a denial of
benefits, rather than upon conflicting medical evidence that supports an award of benefits."
Kuklok, 492 N.W.2d at 575 (citing Jones v. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 461 N.W.2d
273 (N.D. 1990)). In the present case, the court observed that "[tihe contrary medical
evidence, primarily from Dr.. Mayer and Dr. Foster, concluding that [the claimant's]
depression, anxiety, and anger are the result of his employment accidents, was rejected by
the Bureau on the ground that it does not adequately account for [the claimant's] pre-
accident history of psychological problems." Id.
83. Id. at 574. See also infra notes 155, 158, 160 and accompanying text (outlining the
current problems that accompany the use of testimony by mental health experts).
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (providing the limited standard of review
applied to Bureau decisions).
85. Kuklok, 492 N.W.2d at 573. See also 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.22(f), at 7-866
(noting that courts deny compensation where a cause and effect relationship does not exist
between the claimant's prior compensable physical injury and resulting mental disorder).
See also Lyson, 129 N.W.2d at 355. "While the physicians have not been able to account for
the [claimant's] pain upon the basis of concrete physical defects, they have accounted for it
on the basis of neurosis, hysteria and functional overlay." Id. See also Eric Marcus, The
Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress, 30 TRAUMA 2-13, 2-41 (1988). While
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IV. MENTAL-PHYSICAL CLAIMS IN NORTH DAKOTA
A. EXPANSION
The second category of mental stress claim, mental-physical,
has received uniform recognition by all states, including North
Dakota.8 6 In contrast to the relative obscurity of physical-mental
claims, the development of mental-physical claims in North
Dakota has been extensive.87 The majority of the claims involve
heart attacks or strokes caused by mental stress combined with
physical exertion.88 In heart attack and stroke cases, claimants
often seek to establish that their injury was the result of their
employment through assertions that work-related mental and
physical stress caused or substantially contributed to the resulting
injury.8 9
The development of mental-physical claims can be traced to
the early recognition of the compensability of injuries caused by
physical exertion.90 By 1924, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in
Pace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,9 1 recog-
nized that a "physical impact" was not a prerequisite to a compen-
sable injury.92  Rejecting the physical impact requirement, the
court held that injuries suffered as a result of unusual exertions
imposed upon workers by the conditions of their employment
were compensable.9 3
providing an evaluation of various defense and plaintiff strategies employable in mental
disability litigation, Dr. Marcus notes that the threshold step in establishing a mental
disability claim is the conversion of a claimant's behavior into a recognized mental disorder.
Id. at 2-13-14. "This process can only be properly and legally performed by official state
licensed 'conversion agents,' namely psychiatrists and psychologists." Id. at 2-14.
86. See 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.21(a), at 7-813.
87. See Sandlie v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 295 N.W. 497
(N.D. 1941); Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790
(N.D. 1982); Ganske v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 355 N.W.2d 800
(N.D. 1984); Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576
(N.D. 1986).
88. See, e.g., Grace, 395 N.W. 2d at 576 (claimant asserting heart attack caused by
mental stress and physical exertion in extreme heat).
89. See, e.g., Nelson, 316 N.W.2d at 794 (claimant asserting that work-related emotional
stress and physical exertion caused husband's fatal heart attack).
90. See Pace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 201 N.W. 348, 351
(N.D. 1924). In Pace, benefits were sought on behalf of the deceased claimant for injuries
that the claimant suffered while cleaning a boiler in extreme heat. Id. Evidence was
introduced that the claimant's death was the result of a ruptured blood vessel, directly
related to the extreme working conditions under which the claimant was laboring. Id.
91. 201 N.W. 348 (N.D. 1924).
92. Pace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 201 N.W. 348, 351 (N.D.
1924). The court held that injuries caused by working conditions, including extreme heat,
are compensable under workers' compensation in the absence of a physical impact or
injury. Id.
93. Id. The court also held that the plaintiff's preexisting heart condition did not bar
his recovery. Id. "It is quite immaterial that the decedent may have brought with him a
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The elimination of the physical impact requirement opened
the door to recovery for physical injuries caused by mental stimuli.
While early attempts to establish mental-physical claims were
unsuccessful, 94 this lack of success was more a reflection of the
court's adherence to the unusual exertion rule rather than an out-
right rejection of the compensability of mental-physical injuries.95
The effect of the unusual exertion rule in mental-physical cases
was to prevent recovery unless the physical injury was accompa-
nied by an unusual stress or strain on the body. 6
The validity of the unusual exertion rule was soon questioned
by the court.97 In 1976, the Supreme Court of North Dakota in
Stout v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau abrogated the require-
ment.98 The previous standard of unusual exertion was replaced
with the "usual-exertion rule," eliminating "unusual-exertion" as
a prerequisite to compensation in mental-physical cases.99 Under
the "usual exertion" rule, employees can recover for injuries
caused gradually by the routine performance of their
employment.' 00
Following the court's decision in Stout, the number of claims
involving heart disease rose dramatically.010 In response to this
disability." Id. "The evidence supports a finding that the disability brought with him was
aggravated by the conditions under which he was compelled to labor." Id.
94. Sandlie v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 295 N.W. 497, 499
(N.D. 1940). The Sandlie court observed that while acceleration of a preexisting disease
may in certain circumstances be a compensable injury, the plaintiff had failed to prove that
emotional stress was the "proximate cause" of his heart attack. Id. at 499-500.
95. See id. The Sandlie court noted "that every exertion has its effect upon the
physical system." Id.
96. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 38.64, at 7-187.
97. See Suedel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 218 N.W.2d 164,
175 (N.D. 1974). The court, while observing that a majority of jurisdictions allow recovery
for injuries caused by an usual exertion, stated: "[W]e leave for another day the
determination of the survival of the unusual exertion test." Id. at 173-75.
98. 236 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1975). The court held that the unusual exertion rule is
"historically incorrect, logically unsound, and impractical in operation." Id. at 894 (citing
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.61, at 7-98, § 38.62, at 7-100,
§ 38.63, at 7-102).
99. Stout v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 894
(N.D. 1975).
The 'by accident' requirement is now deemed satisfied in most jurisdictions
either if the cause was of an accidental character or if the effect was the
unexpected result of the routine performance of the claimant's duties.
Accordingly, if strain of claimant's usual exertions causes collapse from heart
weakness, back weakness, hernia, and the like, the injury is held accidental. A
very substantial minority of jurisdictions require a showing that the exertion was
in some way unusual, or make other reservation, but this line of decision causes
difficulty because of the constant necessity of drawing distinctions between usual
and unusual strains.
Id. (quoting LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.30, at 7-37).
100. See Stout, 236 N.W.2d at 894.
101. See, e.g., Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d
790 (N.D. 1982) (noting the increase in heart attack claims following the Stout decision).
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increase, the Legislature codified the unusual exertion rule,
amending section 65-01-02 of the North Dakota Century Code to
require "unusual stress" as a prerequisite to recovery in cases
involving heart attacks or strokes.'0 2 In 1989, the "unusual stress"
requirement was extended to include all mental or physical injury
precipitated by mental stimulus.10 3
B. UNUSUAL STRESS AND REASONABLE MEDICAL
CERTAINTY
Mental-physical injuries are compensable in North Dakota if
"precipitated by unusual stress"'1 4 and "causally related to the
employee's employment, with reasonable medical certainty."' 0 5
While the requirements of "unusual stress" and "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" were intended to limit claims,1 0 6 the terms are not
further defined by statute. 0 7 Both terms, however, have been
extensively considered and defined by the courts.10
The requirement of unusual stress does not require that the
work causing an injury differ in nature from the work usually per-
102. 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 579, § 2 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-
02(8XaX3) (Supp. 1991)). See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
103. 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 765, § 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3)
(Supp. 1991)). The claimant is also required by section 65-01-02(8XaX3) to prove a causal
relationship between employment and injury with "reasonable medical certainty." Id.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3) (Supp. 1991).
105. Id. See also Christianson v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 470
N.W.2d 613, 615 (N.D. 1991) (stating that "unusual stress" and "reasonable medical
certainty" are required to prove that a heart attack is compensable); Nelson v. North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790, 795 n.3 (N.D. 1982) (holding
that aggravation awards "absent a showing of unusual stress" are unavailable for mental
physical injuries); Satrom v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 328 N.W.2d
824, 828 (N.D. 1982) (holding that the requirement of unusual stress precludes recovery for
employment-caused diseases covered by section 65-01-02(8XaX3) of the North Dakota
Century Code).
106. Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790, 794
(N.D. 1982).
This provision, inserted by the 1977 Legislative Assembly, Chapter 579, Sec. 2,
1977 N.D. Sess. Laws, is one of the few definitions of injury in the Workmen's
Compensation Act which is directed to specific ailment. A reading of the
legislative history of this amendment to Section 65-01-02 leaves no doubt that it
was enacted as a result of this court's decision in Stout v. N.D. Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 236 N.W. 2d 889 (N.D. 1975), holding that the "usual
exertion" rule in workmen's compensation cases is the law of North Dakota.
Stout involved a claim for death due to a heart attack and the Bureau had argued
that it made awards for heart attacks only where there was evidence of "unusual
exertion" but not where it was "usual." This court held that distinction arbitrary
and refused to follow it. The distinction is now required by statute and we must
apply it in this instance.
Id. at 793-94 n.2.
107. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
108. See, e.g., Schmaltz v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 449 N.W.2d
817, 820-22 (N.D. 1989) (defining unusual stress).
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formed by the claimant.' 0 9 Furthermore, "[u]nusualness may be a
matter of degree, not kind"" 0 and "may appear in duration,
strenuousness, distance or other circumstances involved in the
execution of routine assignments.""' The unusual stress require-
ment is satisfied when an employee's work-related duties impose
an "exceptional strain" upon the employee. 1 2 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has held that work-imposed strains are exceptional
when they result in damage to the employee's heart.1 3 Addition-
ally, determinations of the existence of unusual stress require an
examination of the claimant's entire work history." 4
The claimant can establish sufficient causation by proving"'
with reasonable medical certainty that his or her employment was
the sole cause of, or a substantial contributing factor to, the
injury." 16 The establishment of reasonable medical certainty is
largely dependent upon the testimony and conclusions of medical
experts. "17
109. Nelson, 316 N.W.2d at 796. The Nelson court held that "[u]nusual or
extraordinary over-exertion . . . does not require that the-work causing the attack be
different in nature from the employee's usual work." Id. (quoting City of Denver v.
Industrial Comm'n, 579 P.2d 80, 82 (Colo. 1978)).
110. Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576, 581
(N.D. 1986) (quoting LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.64(aX9)
(1986)).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Schmaltz v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 449 N.W.2d
817, 821-22 (N.D. 1989).
The phrase 'unusual or excessive strain', as sometimes used in describing these
cases, is not so limited in its meaning as to include only work of an entirely
different character from that customarily done. Simply stated, so long as the
conditions of performing the work are such that an exceptional strain is imposed
on the worker so great that his heart is affected and damaged thereby, the
requirement of unusual or excessive strain is satisfied.
Id. (quoting Shecter v. State Ins. Fund, 160 N.E.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. App. 1959)).
113. Schmaltz, 449 N.W.2d at 821-22.
114. See Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576,
581 (N.D. 1986) (holding that unusual stress must be applied according to the employee's
entire work history); Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316
N.W.2d 790, 796 (N.D. 1982) (holding that the "overexertion doctrine" is to be applied to
employee's total work history).
115. See, e.g., Christianson v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 470
N.W.2d 613, 615 (N.D. 1991). "The claimant has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was actually injured in the course of employment
and that the ensuing disability is causally connected to the employment injury." Id. at 615
(citing Inglis v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 312 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 1981)).
116. Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790, 795
(N.D. 1982). "There is no requirement that work-related stress be the sole cause of
infarction; it is sufficient for the stress to be a substantial contributing factor." Id. at 795
(quoting Aker v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 282 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. 1979)).
117. See Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576,
577 (N.D. 1986); Kuntz v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 139 N.W.2d 525, 527 (N.D.
1966) (holding that a causal relationship does not have to be established with "absolute
medical certainty"). But see Ganske v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
355 N.W.2d 800, 802 (N.D. 1984) (finding that physician's testimony alone was insufficient
to establish reasonable medical certainty).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW . [Vol. 69:369
The elements of "unusual stress""" and "reasonable medical
certainty"'1 9 present formidable barriers to recovery for mental-
physical injuries. In addition, each workers' compensation claim is
initially heard by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, the sole
fact finder, and the Bureau decisions are given the "same faith and
credit as the judgment of a court of record.' 120  On contentious
issues in which compensation is denied, recovery is further
restricted by the limited standard of review that is applied to deci-
sions of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau.' 2 1 On
review of Bureau decisions, courts do not make independent find-
ings of fact but determine only "whether a reasoning mind reason-
ably could" have reached the Bureau's factual conclusions.12 2 Not
surprisingly, the success rate of mental-physical claims in the
courts has been dismal.' 23
In Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 24 the claimant sought recovery for a fatal heart attack
that the claimant's husband suffered while performing the light
duty of connecting hoses to his truck. 25 Evidence was introduced
that the decedent suffered emotional stress from the alienation
118. See, e.g., Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d
576, 577 (N.D. 1986) (holding that stress caused by 120 degree temperatures were not
unusual and therefore the claim was denied).
119. See, e.g., Schmaltz v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 449 N.W.2d
817, 824 (N.D. 1989) (implying that reasonable medical certainty requires an undisputed
medical opinion).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-03 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (providing the jurisdiction of
the Workers' Compensation Bureau).
121. See Grace, 395 N.W.2d at 579. "In an appeal from a judgment of the district court
involving the decision of an administrative agency, our review is limited to an examination
of the decision of the agency and not the decision of the district court." Id. (citing Skjefte v.
Job Serv. N.D., 392 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1986)). See also Schmaltz v. North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau, 449 N.W. 2d 817, 820 (N.D. 1989) (stating that a review of
administrative decisions should be conducted with restraint); Christianson v. North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau, 470 N.W.2d 613, 615 (N.D. 1991).
In determining whether an agency's findings of fact are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court does not make independent findings
of fact or substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but determines only
whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual
conclusions reached were proved by the greater weight of evidence.
Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19(5) (1991) (providing that the court is required to affirm
decisions of an administrative agency unless the findings of fact by the agency are not sup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence); Weber v. North Dakota Workmen's Compen-
sation Bureau, 377 N.W.2d 571, 576 (N.D. 1985) (holding that evidence may not be
evaluated by the Bureau in an unreasoned manner).
122. Schmaltz, 449 N.W.2d at 820 (citations omitted).
123. See, e.g., Christianson v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 470
N.W.2d 613, 615 (N.D. 1991).
124. 316 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1982).
125. Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790, 796
(N.D. 1982).
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that resulted from his position as a "working foreman. ' 12 6  In
determining the compensability of the decedent's injuries, the
court considered the decedent's previous health problems, 127 the
nature of the work being performed at the time of the accident, 12 8
and the evidence that the decedent was subjected to unusual emo-
tional stress.'1 9  After considering these fore-mentioned factors,
the court denied compensation based upon the claimant's failure
to prove that the decedent's injuries were both caused by his
employment and precipitated by unusual stress.' 30
The evidence that the decedent's employment subjected him
to unusual emotional stress was limited to the testimony of the
claimant and a "friend" of the decedent's which the court con-
cluded was "scanty at best.' 13 1  The court added that "[o]f all the
categories of emotional causes of heart attacks and cerebral hem-
orrhages the poorest track record belongs to that of anger and
excitement generated by work connected arguments and
fights. "132
In more recent cases, recovery for mental-physical injuries has
been equally unsuccessful.133 In Grace v. North Dakota Work-
126. Id. The decedent was apparently positioned between management and union
employees, receiving pressure from both sides. Id. at n.5.
127. Id. at 796. The decedent in Nelson suffered from hypertension with a history of
cigarette smoking. Id. Evidence at trial indicated that "smoking and hypertension alone
may have caused" the decedent's heart attack but that stress may have "tipped the
balance." Id. at 792. The court also noted that while a "causal connection between the
employment and the heart" is a prerequisite to recovery, employees with preexisting heart
disease "or habits which contribute to heart disease" are not precluded from recovery. Id.
at 795. See also Christianson v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 470 N.W.2d
613, 615 (N.D. 1991) (holding that claimant's "physical condition or personal habits which
made him more prone to heart disease is not reason for denying a claim if the
preponderance of the evidence indicates that the heart attack was causally related to the
employment, with reasonable medical certainty and was precipitated by unusual stress").
128. Nelson, 316 N.W.2d at 796. The court observed that the connecting of hoses by
the decedent to his truck did not support a finding that the heart attack was caused by
unusual physical stress. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 797. The Nelson court held that the claimant had failed to meet the burden
of proof required to participate in workers compensation benefits, stating that:
[C]lose questions involving emotional stress are inevitable when, instead of
colorful triggering events, the employment contribution takes the form of a
more protracted burden of worry, overwork, frustration, guilt, tension, or
apprehension over losing one's job.
Id. (quoting LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.65(C), at 7-202). The
North Dakota Supreme Court reached a similar result in Ganske v. North Dakota Work-
men's Compensation Bureau, 355 N.W.2d 800 (N.D. 1984). In Ganske, the court denied
compensation to the claimant, a cook, who had felt stress prior to suffering a heart attack.
Id. at 802. The court held that the evidence of unusual stress was "scanty at best," and
insufficient to establish the existence of unusual stress. Id. at 803.
131. Nelson, 316 N.W.2d at 796-97.
132. Id. at 797.
133. See Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576
(N.D. 1986). See also Christianson v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 470
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:369
men's Compensation Bureau,134 the claimant argued for benefits
after suffering a heart attack while working as a masonry foreman
in temperatures approaching 120 degrees. 13  The claimant also
suffered emotional stress caused by pressures to complete a con-
struction project on schedule. 136 Additional stress to the claimant
was caused by dangerous working conditions that suspended work
on several occasions. 137  The Workers' Compensation Bureau
denied compensation, holding there was "no evidence of unusual
stress or strain.' 38  Holding that there was insufficient evidence
to set aside the Bureau's decision, the district court and the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.' 39  In a strong dissent, Justice
Meschke noted that there was "clearly evidence of unusual stress"
that had been ignored by the Workers' Compensation Bureau. 140
In affirming the Bureau's decision, the court reiterated the
limited standard of review that is applied to Bureau decisions:
"[W]e do not make independent findings of fact, but ask only
whether or not a reasoning mind reasonably could have deter-
mined [that the claimant's heart attack] was not precipitated by
N.W.2d 613 (N.D. 1991). The claimant in Christianson, a small business owner, suffered a
heart attack during a time period when he was experiencing business-related financial
difficulties. Id. at 616. The claimant was overweight, smoked heavily and suffered from
"mild hypertension." Id. at 615-16. The North Dakota Supreme Court denied
compensation based on insufficient evidence to establish "unusual stress" and a sufficient
causal relationship between the claimant's heart attack and work-related stress. Id. at 616.
The requirements of unusual stress and reasonable medical certainty have been equally
limiting in claims for heart attacks caused by physical rather than emotional stress. See
Schmalz v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 449 N.W.2d 817,823 (N.D. 1989)
(denying compensation for claimant's heart attack which occurred in the presence of "toxic
fumes"). See also Kroh v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 899,
902 (N.D. 1988) (holding that claimant's expanded duties as a cook were insufficient to
establish the existence of unusual stress).
134. 395 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1986).
135. Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576, 577
(N.D. 1986).
136. Id. at 583 (Meschke, J., dissenting). The claimant was in charge of a construction
project that was behind schedule and further delay would have significantly increased his
employer's expenses. Id. In addition the claimant had been recently unemployed and
"[m]asonry jobs had been difficult to find." Id.
137. Id. The claimant was working directly underneath an "unsteady crane," creating
a potentially dangerous work environment that suspended work on several occasions. Id.
138. Grace, 395 N.W. 2d at 583 (Meschke, J., dissenting). The North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau denied the claimant compensation, holding that "'there is no
medical substantiation that the claimant's heart attack was in any way related to his
employment with reasonable medical certainty.'" Id. The Bureau further held "there was
no evidence of unusual stress or strain." Id.
139. Id. at 582. In Grace, compensation was denied primarily because of a lack of
evidence of unusual stress. Id. Both the district court and the North Dakota Supreme
Court did not dispute that the claimant's heart attack was causally related to his
employment. Id. at 583.
140. Id. at 583 (Meschke, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the evidence did not
support the findings of fact by the Bureau. Id. In his dissent, Justice Meschke stated that
the Bureau failed to weigh the evidence of unusual stress and therefore the Bureau's
"conclusions denying benefits are not properly supported by findings." Id. at 584.
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unusual stress."'14 ' Given this limited standard of review, claim-
ants suffering compensable injuries could be denied recovery
solely on the basis of an erroneous finding of fact by the Bureau as
to the existence of unusual stress.
Thus, while mental-physical injuries are compensable in
North Dakota, these claims when brought before the courts have
been largely unsuccessful.1 42  Legislative limitations imposed on
mental-physical injuries in combination with a limited standard of
review present a significant barrier to recovery for mental-physi-
cal claims in North Dakota.' 43
V. MENTAL-MENTAL CLAIMS
A. DEVELOPMENT
The largest increase in mental stress claims has occurred in
claims involving no physical injury.' 44 Claims for mental injuries
caused by employment-related mental stress are the most recent
and most controversial of the mental stress claims. 145 Employees
are filing mental-mental claims in record numbers for conditions
"ranging from job burnout, or mental fatigue from tedium and
stress, to chronic and severe anxiety, manic depression, nervous
breakdown and schizophrenia.' 46 Studies indicate that women
file more stress claims than men and that the age of the average
claimant is less than in other types of workers' compensation
cases.' 47 The majority of stress claims involve white collar work-
ers,1 48 with higher paid managers and professionals "particularly
susceptible to workplace stress.' '1 49
The rising incidence of work-related stress claims reflects the
changes that have taken place in our nation's economy. While
141. Id. at 583.
142. See, e.g., Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d
576, 582 (N.D. 1986) (finding that the claimant's heart attack was not compensable although
causally related to employment).
143. See, e.g., id.
144. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(a), at 7-957. According to Professor Larson, the
number of mental-mental claims has exploded over the last 15 years. Id.
145. See 1B LARSON, supra, note 1, § 42.23, at 7-876. Unlike the other two categories
of mental stress claims, the mental-mental claim has no physical component. Id.
146. Headline: Record Numbers of Workers are Blaming Job Stress for Emotional
Problems, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 76.
147. Donald DeCarlo, Workers' Compensation And Employers' Liability Law:
National Developments, 25 TORT INS. L.J., at 521, 526 (1990). One possible reason for the
disproportionate number of stress claims filed by women may be the emergence and
recognition of sexual harassment in the workplace. See, e.g., Brown v. Alos Micrographics
Corp., 540 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1989) (holding that anxiety caused by sexual harassment in the
workplace was compensable).
148. IB LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(a), at 7-958.
149. DeCarlo, supra note 147, at 527.
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physical injury is the primary hazard faced by employees in
"smoke stack industries," the computer age has placed unprece-
dented levels of psychological stress upon workers.15 The
increased automation and electronic monitoring of the work envi-
ronment has increased stress levels by creating higher expecta-
tions with respect to the individual employee's speed and
efficiency.' 5 '
Developing primarily in the last two decades, 1 2 mental-
mental injuries are now recognized as compensable in a majority
of states.'5 3 Mental-mental claims have been expressly rejected in
150. Headline: Record Numbers of Workers are Blaming Job Stress for Emotional
Problems, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 76. Stress experts agree that "the
computer age is taking its toll in the form of psychological pressure and personal conflicts
that stem from mental strain and boredom." Id.
151. DeCarlo, supra note 147, at 527.
152. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(a), at 7-958. With the exception of several
federal decisions, successful mental-mental claims have occurred after 1970. Id.
153. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.23(c), at 7-927. See Accord Fox v. Alascom Inc.,
718 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1986) (holding that a nervous breakdown caused by work-related
stress was compensable); Ron Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 486 P.2d 207, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1971) (finding that the aggravation of a preexisting "depressive anxiety" resulting from a
police investigation into a work-related accident was compensable); Albertson's, Inc., v.
Workers' Compensation App. Bd., 182 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
traumatic experience was not required to show mental injury); City of Aurora v. Industrial
Comm'n, 710 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that employment-induced
"post traumatic stress syndrome," absent physical injury, was compensable); Battista v.
Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 298 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that a mental injury
caused by work-related verbal abuse was compensable); O'Loughlin v. Circle A Constr., 739
P.2d 347, 349 (Idaho 1987) (holding that "panic disorder" caused by claimant's work-related
blackout could be compensable); Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 343 N.E.2d 913, 913
(Ill. 1976) (holding that mental injury from severe emotional shock traced to specific place
and time was compensable); Yocum v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Ky. 1976) (finding that a
nervous break down, absent physical trauma, was compensable); Sparks v. Tulane Medical
Ctr. Hosp. & Clinic, 546 So. 2d 138, 140 (La. 1989) (holding that mental injury resulting
from threats and harassment was compensable); Pomerleau v. United Parcel Serv., 464 A.2d
206, 208 (Me. 1983) (holding that mental injuries caused by ordinary work pressure were
compensable); Joseph Albanese's Case, 389 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Mass. 1979) (holding that a
mental disorder related to specific work-related stress was compensable); Deziel v. Difco
Labs., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Mich. 1978) (holding that a mental injury believed by
claimant to be work related was compensable); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 95 A.2d
446, (N.J. Super. Ct. 1953) (holding that mental injuries caused by explosion but
unaccompanied by physical injury was compensable) aff'd, 98 A.2d 604 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1953); Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 730 P.2d 470, 474 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that mental injury caused by excitement, shock or emotional disturbance was
compensable), cert. denied, 729 P.2d 1365 (N.M. 1986); Brown v. Alos Micrographics Corp.,
540 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (1989) (holding that anxiety caused by sexual harassment was
compensable); McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 651 P.2d 153, 161 (Or. App. 1982)
(holding that mental injuries caused by work-related mental disorders were compensable),
aff'd, 675 P.2d 159 (Or. 1983); Hish v. Workmen's Compensation App. Bd., 513 A.2d 1147,
1150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that work-related mental illness could be
compensable if causally related to employment); Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84
(Tenn. 1977) (holding that mental injury might satisfy the requirement of injury by
accident); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 315, 321-22 (Tex. 1955) (holding
that mental injury from mental shock was compensable); Breeden v. Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398, 401 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that mental injuries
from work-related harassment were compensable); International Harvester v. Labor &
Indus. Review Comm'n, 341 N.W.2d 721, 722-23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that mental
injuries from the shock of seeing a co-worker burned were compensable); Baker v. Wendy's
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a small number of states that have physical injury requirements for
compensable injuries.' 5 4
Once mental-mental injuries are recognized by a state as
potentially compensable, the issue of causation invariably arises.' 55
Unlike the other mental stress claims, there is no physical element
in mental-mental cases to aid in establishing either the cause or
the extent of the mental injury.1 5 6 This difficulty is compounded
by the fact that mental injuries often result from mixed1 5 7 or mul-
tiple causes.' 58  In addition, certain mental disorders are
extremely difficult to distinguish from malingering, further com-
plicating mental-mental cases.' 5 9 Finally, psychiatric opinions
may contain inherent flaws not present in the medical opinions in
of Montana Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 891 (Wyo. 1984) (holding that nervous injury resulting from
sexual advances was compensable).
154. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(d), at 7-963-64. Eight states, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, and Oklahoma have expressly rejected the
compensability of mental-mental injuries. Id.
155. See, e.g., Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress,
30 TRAUMA 2:14, 2:21 (1988). Dr. Marcus observes:
A distinction between psychiatry and clinical medicine is that psychiatry
contains numerous "theories of causation," rather than widely accepted and
scientifically validated origins of diseases. "Organic" psychiatrists' belief systems
and clinical orientations vary. Some believe that psychiatric diseases are
basically biochemical malfunctions. Others adhere to theories of early childhood
traumatic events. Such widely divergent views of causation cast suspicion on
psychiatric credibility.
Id.
156. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.23. See also Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue
in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a
Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 289 (1983). "When an injury does not include a physical
element.., the policy issues underlying recovery for mental disorders-the genuineness of
the injury and the genuineness of the causal relation between the employment and the
disorder-become more apparent." Id.
157. 1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 7.40, at 3-14. "[M]ixed risks" occur when an
employee's injury is caused by a "personal cause" and an "employment cause." Id. The
general rule in "mixed risk" cases is that recovery is granted when the employment cause
has contributed to the injury. Id.
158. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1987). The medical profession recognizes that the etiology
for the majority of mental disorders is presently unknown. Id. at XXIII. Therefore, mental
injuries are diagnosed on the basis of present manifestations, not previous cause. Id. See
also Marilyn Cohen, Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychneurotic
Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129 (1961).
Unfortunately, the complex etiology of psychoneurosis and the demands of time
for examination are such that in a substantial number of cases a psychiatrist will
be unable to estimate with any degree of accuracy the probabilities of the injury
occurring in the absence of employment. All major schools of psychoanalytic
thought agree that although immediate factors of reality may serve as
precipitating or exciting causes, the adult's predisposition towards a
psychoneurotic reaction lies in the childhood.
Id. at 1142 (footnotes omitted).
159. IB LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.24(b), at 7-949. Professor Larson notes that
"malingering" and "compensation neurosis" are separated by a very fine line. Id. See also
Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress, 30 TRAUMA 2:13,
2:40 (1988). In the detection of malingering, "[a] far better source of evidence concerning
malingering and exaggeration is lay, rather than expert testimony." Id. "Information
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other fields of medicine, creating legitimate questions with
respect to the credibility and accuracy of psychiatric testimony. 16 0
The states recognizing mental-mental claims can be divided
into three groups based on the threshold barriers to recovery they
have imposed for mental-mental injuries. 16 ' The level of coverage
that is provided by a state directly reflects the state's willingness to
compensate mental-mental injuries. 162 Group one compensates
mental-mental injuries caused by gradual or ordinary stress. 16 3
Thus, a claimant's work-related mental-mental injuries are com-
pensable even though the claimant has not been subjected to
gathered from the observations of friends, neighbors and especially impartial witnesses can
be much more credible evidence than evidence derived from experts." Id.
160. See also Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress 30
TRAUMA 2:13, 2:15 (1988). Dr. Marcus notes:
Courts tend to give psychiatric evidence the credibility of medical
testimony without realizing that psychiatric opinions differ substantially from
those in other medical specialties.
It has been advocated that psychiatric opinions be grounded on the bedrock
of established psychiatric descriptive textbooks. This medical model of
psychiatric disorders is based upon labeling and categorizing mental phenomena
as "diseases." However, much has been written to indicate that mental
phenomena do not function at all like physical diseases. Many "mental illnesses"
are more accurately a product of the observer's labeling inclinations.
Id. at 2:14-15.
Every study where it has been possible to test the psychiatric conclusions
against objectively determinable hard data shows that they have consistently
been wrong more often than right ....
Based upon such dismal and embarrassing conclusions regarding psychiatric
objectivity and validity, one wonders why psychiatric opinions are granted the
benefit of "reasonable probability" or "reasonable medical certainty" in the
courtroom. Until such time as psychiatry reaches the degree of predictability
and credibility minimally required of a scientific discipline, the courts and insur-
ance industry would do well to give "common sense" more, or at least as much,
credence as "psychiatric expertise." Courts are becoming increasingly percep-
tive and critical of the data base upon which psychiatric opinions are derived.
Accordingly, the objective or subjective nature of the psychiatrist's data base
needs to be scrutinized.
Id. at 2:22. See also Kuklok v. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 492 N.W.2d 572, 574 (N.D.
1992) (recognizing the limitations of present scientific knowledge in respect to mental dis-
orders resulting in inconsistent medical opinions).
161. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(b). In each of the three types of mental-mental
coverage, claims are evaluated objectively. See id. Contra Deziel v. Difco Lab., Inc., 268
N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1978).
We hold, as a matter of law, that in cases involving mental (including
psychoneurotic or psychotic) injuries, once a plaintiff is found disabled and a
personal injury is established, it is sufficient that a strictly subjective causal nexus
be utilized ... to determine compensability. Under a "strictly subjective causal
nexus" standard, a claimant is entitled to compensation if it is factually
established that claimant honestly perceives some personal injury incurred
during the ordinary work of his employment "caused" his disability.
Id. at 11. Following the court's decision in Deziel, the Michigan Legislature implemented
an objective standard. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.23(d), at 7-931 n.18.
162. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(b), at 7-959.
163. Id. § 42.25(c), at 7-968 n.17. Alaska, California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, New
Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia award compensation for mental injuries
resulting from gradual or ordinary stress. Id. at 7-968-69 n.17.
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stress greater than that usually encountered in the profession. 164
In the second group, mental injuries must be precipitated by unu-
sual stress. 165 States in this group require that the claimant, as a
prerequisite to recovery, establish abnormal stress as the cause of
their mental-mental injury.166 The most restrictive coverage is
provided by the third group, compensating mental-mental injuries
only when injury is caused by sudden mental stimuli. 167 In group
three, compensation for mental-mental injuries is only awarded
when the injuries were caused by abnormal stress which can be
traced to a specific place and time.' 68
B. MENTAL-MENTAL CLAIMS IN NORTH DAKOTA
1. Statutory Law
The compensability of mental-mental injuries is statutorily
prescribed in North Dakota. 169 The state's definition of "compen-
sable injury" was amended in 1989 to include mental injuries
caused by mental stimuli. 7 ° This amendment both clarified and
modernized North Dakota's definition of compensable injury.' 71
The legislative intent of the 1989 amendment was to provide com-
pensation for mental-mental claims subject to the limitations of
"unusual stress" and "reasonable medical certainty" applied in
heart attack and stroke cases.17 2 Therefore, to recover benefits for
164. See Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634, 638 (Alaska 1987) (rejecting the
requirement of a showing of stress greater than that normally found in the claimant's
occupation).
165. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.25(f), at 7-966. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming require unusual stress as a prerequisite to the
compensability of mental-mental injuries. Id. at 7-966-68 n.16. Although the issue of the
compensability of mental-mental injuries has not been addressed, unusual stress is a
prerequisite to recovery in North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3) (Supp.
1991) (finding that injuries resulting from mental stimuli must be precipitated by unusual
stress).
166. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 579 P.2d 555 (Ariz. 1978)
(holding that claimant's nervous breakdown caused by increasing stress resulting from
increased work volume was compensable).
167. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 44.25(e), at 7-964-65. Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, and Washington require sudden stimulus in mental-mental
cases. Id. at 7-964-65 n.ll.
168. See, e.g., Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977) (holding that sudden
stimulus includes "fright, shock or even excessive unexpected anxiety").
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3) (Supp. 1991). See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
170. 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 765, § 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3)
(Supp. 1991)).
171. N.D. STANDING COMM. MINUTES, S.B.2256, Jan. 24, 1989. The 1989 amendments
were in direct response to a dramatic increase in the number of mental injury claims filed
and were designed to clarify coverage and limit litigation. See id. (testimony of Pat Meyer,
Assistant Claims/Rehabilitation Manager, North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau).
172. Id. (testimony of Dean Haas, Assistant Attorney General).
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mental-mental injuries, claimants must prove their injuries were
"precipitated by unusual stress."'11 3 Claimants must also establish
a causal relationship between their mental injury and their
employment with "reasonable medical certainty."'1 7 4 Mental inju-
ries arising out of a "bona fide personnel action" are not compen-
sable except when such action is the "intentional infliction of
emotional harm.'117 5
While the legislature has recognized the compensability of
mental-mental injuries, the North Dakota Supreme Court has not
yet considered the issue.' 76 The court has, however, in related
decisions, commented on the compensability of mental-mental
injuries.17 7
In Choukalos v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Subsection 3 on page 5 contains the current language which requires a worker to
establish unusual stress in claims for heart attack or stroke. The subsection
expands this requirement to claims of mental injury induced by mental stress
.... The rationale for the unusual stress rule is to require that the work be a true
stressor before benefits are paid. If an individual with substantial pre-existing
emotional problems perceives normal working conditions as stressful, and
cannot continue working, many psychiatrists will term this an adjustment action
to the work, thereby drawing a cause and effect relationship between the normal
work activities and the psychiatric disability. An unusual stress rule will still
allow a worker to claim benefits, but will require the worker to show something
more than ordinary work activities caused the psychiatric disability.
Id. (testimony of Dean Haas, Assistant Attorney General). The requirement of unusual
stress serves two interests. First, workers are compensated on a limited basis for mental-
mental injuries. Id. In addition, workers' compensation is not overburdened with meritless
claims and forced to act as a "universal insurer." Id.
173. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3) (Supp. 1991). See supra note 36 and
accompanying text. When originally introduced, this section required mental injuries to be
"precipitated by unusual stress, objectively viewed." Darnell v. North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau, 450 N.W.2d 721, 724 n.3 (N.D. 1990). While the "objectively
viewed" language was deleted, the requirement of unusual stress has been interpreted in
North Dakota as an objective standard that is applied individually to each worker based on
his or her previous work history. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XaX3) (Supp. 1991). See supra notes 109, 112, 116,
117 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of unusual stress and reasonable
medical certainty).
175. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XbX9) (Supp. 1991). This section provides that "[a]
mental or emotional injury arising principally out of a bona fide personnel action, including
a transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination except such action that is an intentional
infliction of emotional harm" is not compensable. Id. This section is a legislative affirmation
and expansion of the North Dakota State Supreme Court's decision in Choukalos v.
Workers' Compensation Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1988), denying benefits due to
stress from the termination of employment. N.D. STANDING COMM. MINUTES S.B. 2256,
Jan. 24, 1989 (testimony of Dean Haas, Assistant Attorney General). The Choukalos court
held that "[b]ecause Workers' Compensation benefits are not available for mental injury
resulting from termination of employment, an employee whose employment has been
terminated can pursue other remedies." Choukalos, 427 N.W.2d at 346 (citing Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 192 Cal. Rptr. 643 (Ct. App. 1983)).
176. Darnell v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 450 N.W.2d 721, 725
(N.D. 1990) (noting that the issue of the compensability of mental-mental claims has not yet
been considered).
177. See id.
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Bureau,17 8 the claimant filed for workers' compensation benefits
for mental injuries resulting from the termination of his employ-
ment.'79  Following the termination, the claimant became "agi-
tated and depressed."' 180 At trial, medical experts testified that the
claimant's "termination from employment 'was a substantial con-
tributing factor to the claimant's mental functioning' and 'was a
precipitating event in the claimant's acute mental state.' "181 The
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the Bureau's denial of com-
pensation, holding that mental injuries resulting from the termina-
tion of employment are not compensable.' 82 However, the court
noted that since workers' compensation benefits are unavailable
for termination-related mental injuries, other traditional tort rem-
edies may be pursued by the claimant. 8 Therefore, absent tor-
tious conduct, employers remain free to implement personnel
decisions without the potential threat of liability for mental stress
claims. ' 8 4
In a more recent case, the claimant sought recovery after suf-
fering a relapse into alcoholism following a poor work evalua-
tion.18 5  The claimant, a prison guard, received an employment
evaluation from his supervisor that rated his work performance as
poor. 8 6 After receiving the evaluation, the claimant "drank three
178. 427 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1988).
179. Choukalos v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 345
(N.D. 1988).
180. Id.
181. Id. The Workers' Compensation Bureau conceded that the claimant's mental
injuries were caused by an underlying mental condition that had been triggered by
employment. Id.
182. Id. at 346. Writing for the majority, Justice Levine stated:
The workers' compensation statutes were enacted to protect workers from
the hazards of employment. Absent a clear legislative statement, we do not
believe that the Legislature intended the workers' compensation statutes to
protect workers from the hazard of termination of employment. Thus, we do
not believe that a mental injury resulting from termination of employment was
intended by the Legislature to constitute a compensable injury.
Id. The 1989 amendments to section 65-01-02(8XbX9) represent the legislature's affirma-
tion of the court's decision in Choukalos. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8XbX9) (Supp.
1991). The holding of Choukalos was expanded by statute to include mental injuries result-
ing from transfer and promotion. Id. While the language of section 65-01-02(8XbX9) may
suggest that intentional tortious acts are covered by workers' compensation, that interpre-
tation of the statute would violate the express intent of the legislature as well as the holding
in Choukalos. Id.
183. Choukalos, 427 N.W.2d at 346 (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp., v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 192 Cal. Rptr. 643 (Ct. App. 1983)).
184. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (stating that mental injuries resulting
from personnel decisions are not compensable).
185. Darnell v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 450 N.W.2d 721, 722
(N.D. 1990). In Darnell, the claimant contended that job depression and stress in
conjunction with a poor employment evaluation triggered his alcoholism. Id.
186. Id. The evaluation stated that the claimant was prone to making mistakes and
that his work was not reliable. Id.
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quarts of whiskey" and, as a result, was hospitalized.187 The claim-
ant was diagnosed as suffering from "psuedoseizures and depres-
sion."18 8 The claimant testified that it was his honest belief that
the "stress of his employment substantially contributed to and trig-
gered his pre-existing, asymptomatic alcoholism."' 89  The
Supreme Court of North Dakota denied compensation, holding
that the claimant's subjective beliefs were insufficient to establish a
causal relationship between the claimant's alcoholism and his
employment. 190 In passing on the issue of mental-mental claims,
the court noted the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship in
mental-mental cases. 19' The court also observed that "[t]he cau-
tiousness used in evaluating [mental-mental] injuries is reflected
by the different threshold standards utilized [by the different
states] before those types of claims are compensable."'' 92
2. Policy
Compelling policy arguments favor the recognition of mental-
mental injuries as compensable. 93 Regardless of origin, mental
injuries can be as disabling as the most severe physical injuries. 194
In addition, advances in the medical profession have provided reli-
able objective procedures for the diagnosis of mental injuries.' 95
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Darnell, 450 N.W.2d at 724.
190. Id. at 727. The Darnell court refused to apply a subjective test for causation. Id.
at 725. The court, in its reasoning, discussed the subjective test for causation, stating:
We note that the subjective causal nexus test relied upon by Harold and adopted
in Dezeil v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., supra, has been frequently criticized and
rarely followed because it "ignores the nature of neurotic disabilities which seek
to fasten blame for unresolved inner conflicts on any convenient scapegoat such
as one's employer" and fosters the conclusion that trivial employment injuries
should be "permitted to act as a 'hook' on which neurotics can hang their
troubles."
Id. at n.6 (quoting Thomas Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial
Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 907 (1986-87)).
191. Darnell, 450 N.W.2d at 725. "This court has recognized the difficulty involved
with independent claims for infliction of emotional distress in the law of torts." Id. at n.5(citing Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989)). See also Muchow v. Lindblad,
435 N.W.2d at 920 (N.D. 1989) (observing that claims for "emotional distress have troubled
courts because emotional distress may be real and serious in some situations, while trivial,
feigned, or imagined in others"). The Darnell court also noted the difficulties that arise
with causation in mental-mental cases. Darnell, 450 N.W.2d at 725 n.5 (citing McGarrah v.
State Accident. Ins. Fund, 675 P.2d 159 (Or. 1983) (finding that mental-mental injuries are
one of the most complex issues in workers' compensation)).
192. Darnell, 425 N.W.2d at 725 n.5.
193. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.23(a), at 7-905-06.
194. See, e.g., Lyson v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351, 354 (N.D.
1964). "Neuroses, emotional disturbances, and mental illnesses can be as disabling as the
most serious of physical injuries .... " Id.
195. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1987); 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.23(a), at 7-
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Furthermore, refusing to award benefits to an employee who has
suffered a mental injury as a direct result of her employment vio-
lates the purpose 19 6 and intent 97 of workers' compensation in
North Dakota. The once acceptable distinction between mental
and physical injuries is arbitrary and unsupported by either "legal
or medical theory."'9g8
While public policy mandates that mental-mental injuries be
compensable, the integrity and viability of workers' compensation
systems are dependent upon the placing of threshold limitations
upon those claims. In the small minority of states that do not
impose threshold limitations on mental-mental claims, 199 workers'
compensation has been grossly abused by claimants, physicians
and lawyers.2 °° Claimants in these states are encouraged through
906. Contra Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress, 30
TRAUMA 2:13, 2:21 (1988). Numerous potential problems are created by the reliance on the
"Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" in workers' compensation
litigation. Id.
In light of these constant revisions in the descriptions of psychiatric
conditions, courts need to bear in mind the potential pitfalls of accepting a
"current" psychiatric diagnosis at face value.
Furthermore, since so-called "official" psychiatric diagnoses are subject to
considerable controversy, especially when utilized in litigation contexts, a quote
in regard to the usage of official psychiatric diagnoses is critical:
"DSM-III is a clinical manual that is not directly translatable into legal
language. It is not intended for use in clarifying legal issues. The American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law recommends that a disclaimer be inserted
in DSM-III to prevent its misuse in forensic settings."
Id.
196. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing the purpose of workers'
compensation).
197. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (showing that the legislature intended
that mental-mental injuries be compensable). In addition, workers' compensation statues
are to be liberally construed and broadly applied. See supra notes 27 and accompanying
text.
198. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 42.23(a), at 7-906. Professor Larson notes:
Perhaps in earlier years, when much less was known about mental and nervous
injuries and their relation to "physical" symptoms and behavior, there was an
excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for ruling out recoveries based on
such injuries, both in tort and in workmen's compensation. But the excuse no
longer exists.
Id.
199. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (listing the states that do not impose
threshold restrictions on recovery for mental-mental claims).
200. Rita Maroney McPeake, Workers' Compensation, 335 PRACT. LAw INST., 401
(1992). In California, the explosion of mental-mental claims has reached crisis proportions.
Id. The media is filled with advertisements targeted at workers who may feel that their
work is too demanding and that encourage workers to file claims independent of whether
they have actually suffered an injury. Id. California has become riddled with "[w]orkers'
compensation 'mills' " that find a stress-related disability for nearly everyone who walks
through their doors. Id. Claimants are encouraged to file claims and then bill the insurer
with inflated medical charges as a means of forcing settlement. Id. See also Eric H. Marcus,
The Anatomy Of Litigation Involving Mental Distress, 30 TRAUMA 2:13, 2:30 (1988)
(reporting that health professionals are predisposed to finding something wrong with
patients based upon "humanitarian" and "economic" bias).
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advertisements by lawyers and physicians to seek workers' com-
pensation benefits regardless of whether the claimant has suffered
a real injury.2° '
Thus, the issue of the compensability of mental-mental inju-
ries requires the balancing of a state's desire to promote prosperity
through the compensation of its workers for work related injuries
against the potential for abuse in the workers' compensation sys-
tem.20 2  While it remains clear that mental-mental injuries should
be compensable, it is equally clear that compensation for these
types of claims should be subjected to some threshold limitation to
ensure the validity of the claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
All three categories of mental stress claims physical-mental,
mental-physical and mental-mental are compensable under North
Dakota Workers' Compensation statutes.20 3 While only physical-
mental and mental-physical claims have been recognized by the
North Dakota Supreme Court, it appears certain that upon future
consideration the court may find mental-mental injuries compen-
sable.20 4 Providing compensation for workers who suffer employ-
ment caused mental-mental injuries is supported by strong policy
arguments and is consistent with the North Dakota Supreme
Court's previous application of workers' compensation statutes in
this state.20 5
The recovery for mental-mental injuries will, however, be
subject to the same limitations imposed by the legislature on
206mental-physical injuries. The requirements of "unusual stress"
and "reasonable medical certainty" represent a statutory compro-
201. Id. See Murial Dobbin, Record Numbers of Workers are Blaming Job Stress for
Emotional Problems, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 76 (asserting the liberal
compensation of mental-mental injuries without threshold limitations "invites litigation").
202. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text (outlining the various threshold
limitations that states impose before compensating mental-mental injuries).
203. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that workers' compensation
statutes require unusual stress for injuries from mental stimulus).
204. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (providing the rationale for
compensating mental-mental injuries).
205. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (following a liberal plain meaning
approach in the application of workers' compensation statutes).
206. N.D. STANDING COMM. MINUTES, S.B. 2256, Jan. 24, 1989. Because of the
problems inherent in the testimony of mental stress experts, the establishment of
"reasonable medical certainty" and "unusual stress" will be especially burdensome to
claimants seeking relief for mental-mental injuries. See supra notes 158, 160 and
accompanying text. While it appears certain that the North Dakota Supreme Court will
recognize the compensability of mental-mental claims, the success rate for mental-mental
claims brought before the courts will be predictably lower than the dismal success rate
enjoyed by mental-physical claims. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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mise where the benefits available to workers are limited in
exchange for guarantees of legitimacy as to the cause and extent of
the worker's injury. °7
These requirements, combined with the limited standard of
review that is applied to Bureau decisions, present a significant
barrier to recovery for mentally stimulated injuries virtually elimi-
nating the potential for system abuse.20 8 Therefore, to avoid bur-
dening injured workers with the cost of mentally stimulated
industrial accidents, it is imperative that section 65-01-02(8XaX3)
of the North Dakota Century Code be applied liberally and
broadly in the tradition of workers' compensation in North
Dakota.2 o9
Kurt Lamp
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (outlining the elements of unusual
stress and reasonable medical certainty required for a compensable mental-mental injury).
209. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting that workers' compensation
statutes are interpreted liberally).
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